It's impossible to know for sure what ultimately can be accomplished. But I would like to make a few clarifications.

1. CRN has no desire to become a regulatory body with enforcement powers as implied. Our aim, rather, is to encourage the design and creation of an effective global administrative council to oversee molecular manufacturing, under the auspices of a recognized and respected international organization.

2. One of CRN's key points for safe use of molecular manufacturing is the creation of a worldwide network of restricted nanofactories. Wide availability of free or low cost basic products could go a long way toward reducing the incentive for independent development of MNT capability. In turn, this would lessen the need for the type of ubiquitous surveillance suggested above. For more, see our paper at http://CRNano.org/safe.htm.

3. We've addressed the issue of providing free dissemination of knowledge while still protecting legitimate intellectual property rights in our paper on administration at http://CRNano.org/systems.htm.

4. I'm glad you agree that "CRN may have a useful strategy over the next few decades", because that's all we're concerned with at this point. Our focus is on the next 10-20 years. After that, it's obvious that the problems and capabilities (including regulatory capabilities) concerning MNT will change drastically. We're convinced, however, that unless we can implement some form of regulation in the short term, there may not be a long term to worry about. CRN wants to avoid large and foreseeable dangers in the immediate future, and, if possible, encourage the formation of structures that will be good foundations for longer-term issues.

As much as I have a great deal of respect for both Chris and Mike *and* as much as I would like to see a regulatory environment that promotes the safe use of nanotechnology I feel that it is necessary to point out that this ultimately cannot be accomplished.

Why? Because nanotechnology is small technology. It does not require large mines for uranium or large factories with hundreds of centrifuges for isotope separation. To detect and manage prohibited nanotechnology development one would have to implement ubiquitous surveillance and presumably some automated intelligence to interpret what is being observed.

As I pointed out at the Foresight 2003 SA conference — I own DNA synthesizers. So there are minimal barriers to my pulling off the recreation of a polio, influenza or smallpox virus (cost being a limiting factor). Even if the manufacture and use of DNA synthesizers were heavily regulated I (and many other chemical engineers) would know how to create such machines using unregulated resources. Bottom line — as knowledge becomes increasingly available the regulation of the use of such knowledge becomes increasingly futile.

This is clearly pointed out by the fact that while the CRN may have a useful strategy over the next few decades its long term perspective is pointless. One either has to imprison any and all intelligence within a CRN enforced framework (i.e. there is *no* independent colonization of bodies within or external to our solar system) or allow for the fact that the development of non-"responsible" uses of nanotechnology is inevitable. And IMO in those cases one had best have a good defense available.

Robert