Possible cloning ban: effect on nanotech?
from the temporary-controversy dept.
Excerpted from the Feb. 2002 Foresight Senior Associate Letter, by Eric Drexler and Chris Peterson: "The U.S. Senate is debating a possible complete ban on human cloning, both therapeutic and reproductive. People who object to both are objecting to tampering with cells that (via reproductive cloning) could lead to human life. Such a ban could be passed without much public comment, so if you have strong views on this, get them in immediately; see www.lef.org for info on how.
"If such a ban were passed, it would not obstruct progress toward molecular manufacturing: cloning isn't an enabling technology here. In the long term, advanced nanotechnologies will eliminate the incentive for therapeutic cloning, so those who oppose such procedures may become strong advocates of nanotechnology."
February 15th, 2002 at 11:13 PM
Wow [lameness filter didn't like this title]
It seems politicians will never get a clue. Let's break this down.
Biotech is mostly harmless, in that you can't do that much with it do bad things. Sure, someone might use it to make some kind of super virus, but the worst that that could do is kill all life on Earth. Well, so sad for us, but the universe goes on.
Nanotech, on the other hand, has the possibility to kill all activity in the universe by turning it into goo. Even on a more local scale, nanotech weapons are potentially much more deadly than biotech.
And, furthermore, politicians aren't even really worried about biotech weapons. They're concerned with cloaning, which has military uses only insofar as it has general uses. If anyone can get replacement organs quickly, so can the military (maybe even out in the field). Attack of the Clones, is, quite frankly, science fiction and shows a serious misunderstanding of what cloaning is capable of.
In short, if nanotechnology gets a boost from this, it's only because politicians have no idea what they are doing. Positive ends are nice, but better if they come via the right means.
February 18th, 2002 at 12:55 PM
no impact
In the near term a lack of progress in conventional biological medicine doesn't seem likely to put more emphasis on nanotech development as a substitute. Medical nano's benefits are perceived to be too far out to be a resonable alternative.
As well, even if the battle for cloning rights is lost in the legal arena, I don't see a predictable negative consequence for nanotech policy. Politicians respond reactively to these anti-technological movements – they don't do anything until some constituency develops regarding the issue. And no strong public sentiment regarding nanotech will form until there is a substantial public consensus that MNT is feasible.
Beyond those more practical limits to any impact, I really wonder about how our broader society is going to get a handle on the threats that MNT may really represent. We don't have a century of biotech horror stories (think Frankenstein), or the powerful imagery of the atomic era (think Bikini Atoll) to drive the issue into the public consciousness.
Getting the public to take MNT seriously still seems to be a bigger hurdle than encouraging politicians to not over-react.
February 20th, 2002 at 6:41 PM
cloning ban is important
The benefits of embryo cloning for deriving embryonic stems cells for therapeutic purposes, as compared with other therapeutic routes or other ways of deriving pluripotent cell colonies, are uncertain, and it is highly likely that alternative avenues are available in contemporary biotechnology, as it is certain that alternatives would exist in the context of advanced molecular nanotechnology.
At the same time, unless we want people to soon start routinely reproducing by means of cloning, with all that implies for the future practice of human genetic engineering, and other routes of dehumanization, it is important to put in place a very simple and fundamental ban on reproductive cloning, and if the price of doing that is to make a coalition with the antiabortion forces and extend the ban to cover all human embryo cloning, then I think the price would seem to be worth it.
February 21st, 2002 at 7:22 AM
Oped on Cloning
I have a column on FoxNews.Com that's rather critical of most anti-cloning arguments. Unfortunately, I wrote it before Charles Murtaugh's article on the subject appeared yesterday. I think Murtaugh is wrong, but he's much more intellectually honest than, say, Leon Kass or Daniel Callahan.
March 5th, 2002 at 3:17 PM
Re:Oped on Cloning
Fortunately, cloning is a temporary controversy. I highly respect Glenn Reynolds' considerable intellect and good will, so I'm loath to criticize anything he writes, such as his editorial "Cloning Opponents Haven't Made Their Case" at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,46102,00.html. He is correct in his note to Kass that "'Slippery Slope' arguments are well and good, but you must still establish that the bottom of the slope is a bad place." Reynolds is also fairly correct in that the case against cloning is often poorly made. Unfortunately, Reynolds missed three fairly common arguments against cloning. First, as Foresight Director Chris Peterson told me a few years ago, ìCloning is silly. There is already one of me – been there, done that.î (see http://www.islandone.org/MMSG/99jan.htm#_Toc456110 959) This emotional argument, even if true, cannot be answered by any rational response. But it may point to dark motivations that might drive cloning enthusiasts. Perhaps Peterson is so self-actualized and psychologically healthy that she canít imagine the deep-seated neuroses that might impel someone to make copies of him or herself. Taking a darker view, perhaps she is like me ñ maybe I find such neuroses unimaginable because Iím so busy denying them in myself. A second common objection to cloning has to do with the utilitarianization of children, i.e. making them into means instead of ends in themselves. As Charles Murtaugh put it, ìchildren do not live for our pleasure.î It is unfortunately true that natural parents sometimes treat their children as means to an end; for example by living vicariously through them in sports. But this is using them, not loving them, and it is wrong. The problem is that cloning will encourage this type of abuse. A third argument claims that love, sex, and the begetting and raising children are all inexorably intertwined, so that separating them, as cloning does, is inherently disordered and damaging. This is the theoretical basis that underlies the Catholic Churchís consistent position against cloning, birth control, adultery, and homosexuality. This basis is not unreasonable, since it is well known that children need a stable and loving atmosphere in order to thrive, and that this environment is more likely to exist when their parents have given themselves totally to each other in a permanent covenant of love. It seems that sterile sex is pleasurable with less risk (since it avoids the hard work of raising children, and the possibility of doing a bad job of it), but it is not as powerful as sex in which the potential consequences may enable one to expand his or her circle of love by creating new people. In addition, making babies with lab equipment simply does not have the potential for ecstasy. Many of Reynoldsí specific points are correct, though not always completely so. First, he argues correctly that the dangerousness of cloning only means that cloning is wrong when using poor technology. However, he doesn't explain how the technology is supposed to get better without endangering the lives and health of many clones (some problems may not show up until adulthood). After all, it is ethical for ill people to voluntarily submit to unproven technologies (such as artificial hearts) in the hopes that it will do what proven methods cannot: extend their life. But how can a clone volunteer for unproven research? Second, Reynolds doesn't fear the loss of diversity from cloning, reasoning that if everyone cloned themselves then we will have just as much diversity as before. That is certainly true, but if the tendency to clone oneself has any genetic predisposition, then clones will be more likely to clone themselves. Think of it as evolution in action. Reynolds recognizes that six billion clones of any one person will be a problem, but misses itís high likelihood, since the most aggressively self-assured people (e.g. Ron Hubbard and other religion-founding science fiction authors) will have the strongest tendencies to clone themselves, and their clones will be most likely clone themselves, ad infinitum. Third, the idea of clones being soulless zombies is so ridiculous that the only reasonable response is to make fun of it, as Reynolds does so well. He also correctly disputes the claims that cloning would "be playing God" by pointing to medical advances that obviate those claims. On the other hand, ìplaying Godî is not identical to ìgives me the williesî, unless we are making God in our own image. Reynolds correctly dismisses the "cloning gives me the willies" argument as an emotional statement with little place in a reasoned debate, though I must add one caveat: If a logical argument leads us to a position in which we find ourselves not disgusted by genocide or murder, then something is likely wrong with our emotions and our logic. And societies have used logical and scientific arguments to justify slavery, genocide, and murder, so the absence of ìthe williesî is no proof that something is good. Fourth, Reynolds dismisses cloning as "acting against God's will", but he does so too quickly. He doesn't examine the reasons why something may or may not be "against God's will". To be fair, rarely do the people who raise this argument, either. On the other hand, many people do not believe in the Abrahamic notion of God, but still believe that the biblical commandments forbidding murder, lying, stealing, and adultery are sound principles by which to write legal codes (e.g. it is good for individuals and society). So it is entirely possible that sound principles exist by which arguments can be made against cloning. Finally, we come to Reynoldsí rebuttal to the proposition that "Clones are unnatural." His answer is correct, in that vaccinations are moral, even though (since human beings invented them) they are not ìnaturalî. Understood correctly, his rhetorical question, "Why are ënaturalí things necessarily good?" actually leads to a cogent approach to deliberating about clones. The word "nature" has two meanings: in the one that Reynolds uses, it means, "having to do with the natural (i.e. non-human) order of things." Since humans are a product of natural evolution, anything we do might be construed as "natural", but that is quibbling. Another definition of ìnatureî, first identified by the ancient Greeks, has to do with ìthe inherent character or essence of a person or thing." The essential nature of a clone is the same as the essential nature of an identical twin. In his editorial, Reynolds repeatedly recognizes this fact. And the essential nature of an identical human twin is the same as that of any other human person. So by his or her very existence, a clone shares the same essential personhood we all share, and possesses the same inalienable human rights as every other human being, including a right to life, liberty, and knowledgeable consent before participating in experiments. Virginia Postrel and others think that it is ludicrous that a 100-cell blastocyst is a human being. But then when does a blastocyst gain the essence of what it means to be a person? Humanity can't be a gradual characteristic, such as intellectual development, because otherwise there would be no logical reason to not terminate the severely retarded. And isn't that clump of 100 cells exactly what every single human being is at that stage of development? Before conception, there is no human being over which to have a controversy. After conception, before the zygote can divide more than five times (32 totipotent cells), twinning can occur. At this stage, at least one person exists, and maybe more. But this uncertainty over numbers does not mean that one or many clones have any less rights than any other human being at this or any other stage of development. It is true that a blastocyst is tiny and hasn't formed any identifiable arms or legs, but if modern science has taught us anything, it is that things aren't always what they seem. Since ancient times, we have recognized that whenever there is any question about the humanity of a stranger, then we ought give him or her the benefit of the doubt (though of course history is full of examples in which this belief has not been applied). Eric Drexler quoted this maxim to me when referring to sentient robots and uploaded personalities, and in fact it is encoded in legal codes that require hunters to be certain of the identity of targets before shooting. The same principle applies to clones. Tihamer "Tee" Toth-Fejel Tihamer.Toth-Fejel@veridian.com (734) 994-1200 x 3525
April 13th, 2007 at 1:46 PM
I do not believe in cloneing I think it would be the worst mistake that humans could make